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Abstract 
A biometric template is a digital reference of distinct characteristics that are extracted from a biometric sample. 
The feature set obtained during enrollment is stored in the system database as a template.  
 Disparate passwords, when biometric templates are compromised, it is not feasible for a valid user to 
rescind his biometric identifiers and change to another set of uncompromised identifiers. Due to this irrevocable 
nature of biometric data, attacks against the stored templates constitute a major security and privacy peril in a 
biometric system. The primary aim of this paper is to propose a novel technique for security of templates by using 
fuzzy vault implementation. The first proposed approach is used to extract the feature point from finger knuckle 
print (FKP). This approach uses an image processing techniques to extract the biometric feature from the user’s 
finger knuckle print.  
The second approach is one of unimodal fuzzy vault implementation. Fuzzy vault is a cryptographic framework 
that binds the biometric template with a uniformly random key to build a secure sketch of the template. Only the 
secure sketch is stored and if the original template is uniformly random, it is not feasible to retrieve either the 
template or the key without any knowledge of the user’s biometric data. 
    The performances of the proposed approaches are evaluated using the experimental observation. The 
simplicity and efficiency of the proposed methods make it readily applicable in various security fields. The 
performance of the proposed fuzzy vault implementation has been evaluated for Hong Kong polytechnic 
university FKP database.  In this fuzzy vault implementation for biometric evaluation the performance metrics 
used are Failure-to-Capture Rate (FTCR), Genuine Accept Rate (GAR) and  False Accept Rate (FAR) 
 Performance analysis is carried out in two phases. In the initial phase, the secret key size is varied and 
the results are obtained. In phase two, the effect of adding salt and pepper noise is considered. Noise is added to 
analyze the strength of the fuzzy vault implementation. 
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1. Introduction  
FKP is the image pattern of skin present on the back surface of finger. Each finger has three joints. 
There are three bones in each finger called the proximal phalanx, the middle phalanx and the distal 
phalanx. The first joint is where the finger joins the hand called the proximal phalanx. The second joint 
is the proximal interphalangeal joint, or PIP joint. The last joint of the finger is called the distal 
interphalangeal joint, or DIP. 
Finger knuckle is the back surface of finger and it is also known as dorsum of the hand. The inherent 
skin pattern of the outer surface around the phalangeal joint of one’s finger has high capability to 
discriminate different individuals. Such image pattern of finger knuckle is unique and can be obtained 
either online or offline for authentication1.  
Extraction of features of knuckle for identification totally depends upon the user. Among all the 
modalities, finger knuckle print is broadly explored which has not yet attracted significant attention of 
researchers. Finger knuckle is user-centric, contactless and unrestricted access control. As it is 
contactless there is no chance of spoof of physical presence i. e. anti-spoofing. Finger knuckle has high 
textured region. Many samples are available per hand and independent to any behavioural aspect. No 
stigma of potential criminal investigation is associated with this approach. 
 
2. Literature survey 
 
The security and authentication is still a challenging problem in modern days. There are various 
techniques available in the literature, which make use of passwords, smart cards, etc., to provide 
network related security. But these conventional authentication systems have a lot of limitations. Some 
of the problems of the traditional authentication systems are as follows: 
 There is a possibility to forget the password. 
 Moreover, a compromised password can lead an unauthorized user to have access to the 
accounts of the valid user. 
 Traditional authenticated systems are not reliable in all situations. 
 Most of the template protection techniques fail to meet all the desired requirements of a 
practical biometric system like revocability, security, privacy and high matching accuracy. 
A template is essentially a compact representation (a set of invariant features) of the biometric sample 
that is stored in a system database. If the security of stored templates is compromised, the attacker can 
fabricate physical spoof samples to gain unauthorized access. Such efforts have been detailed in 2, 3, 4. 
The stolen templates can also be abused for other unintended purposes, e. g. performing unauthorized 
credit-card transactions or accessing health related records. One of the most vital harmful attacks on a 
biometric system happens when it is against the biometric templates. Attacks on the templates can lead 
to grave vulnerabilities where a template can be replaced by an impostor’s template to achieve 
unlawful access, or a physical spoof can be fashioned from the template2,5,6 to achieve unauthorized 
access to the system, or the stolen template can be replayed to the matcher to have unauthorized 
access. Hence, biometric templates should not be stored in plaintext form and foolproof methodologies 
are essentially needed to store the templates securely such that both the safety of the application and 
the users' solitude are not compromised by an adversary’s attacks. In this paper, a thorough 
experimental result is presented to show the superiority of the biometric authentication systems and 
secure template storage using finger knuckle print as the biometric.  
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3. Finger knuckle preprocessing and feature extraction 
 
3.1 FKP Preprocessing 
 
Critical steps in automatic biometric matching involve using automatically and reliably extracted 
minutiae from the input biometric images of finger knuckle print. However, the performance of a 
minutiae extraction algorithm relies heavily on the quality of the input biometric images. In order to 
ensure that the performance of an automatic biometric identification/verification system is robust with 
respect to the quality of input biometric images, it is essential to incorporate a biometric preprocessing 
algorithm prior to feature extraction. The input finger knuckle print images are pre-processed using 
various techniques so as to make the image fit for the extraction process as in14, 15, 16, 17, 18. The various 
techniques employed are image scaling, double precision, conversion to gray, binary encoding, median 
filter and morphological (erosion) operation. 
 
3.2 Feature Extraction 
 
Each of the preprocessed finger knuckle images is feature extracted.  The ROI of FKP is operated 
on in eight directions using the Sobel compass operator to find edges. The Sobel masks used are shown 
in Fig.1. The original Local Binary Pattern (LBP) operator by7 is employed here for the feature 
extraction of FKP. This operator assigns a label to every pixel in an image by thresholding the eight 
neighborhood pixels with respect to the gray value of its center. The feature vector is formed by 
concatenating the thresholded binary bits in the anti-clockwise direction, shown in Fig. 1. The LBP 
code is invariant to any monotonic transformation of the pixel values. Therefore, it is very appropriate 
for representing the knuckles which are illuminated from a fixed distance but with varying light 
intensity. An extension to LBP code can be made using a subset of LBP string. An LBP string is called 
uniform if it consists of at most 2 bit-wise transitions from 0 to 1 or vice-versa. For example, the 
process of obtaining the binary label for a pixel is shown in Fig. 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Sobel operators in eight directions 
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Fig. 2. Obtaining a binary label for a pixel 
 
Using the approach in7 the images are divided into N equal sub-windows and the texture descriptor is 
extracted from each sub-window in eight directions by the application of the Sobel operator. These 
descriptors are used to obtain the binary labels; these labels are then concatenated to form the feature 
vector. 
 
3.3 Fuzzy vault using FKP 
 
Fuzzy vault, is a cryptographic construction that is designed to work with biometric features which are 
represented as an unordered set (e. g. minutiae in fingerprint) as in8. The security of the fuzzy vault 
scheme is based on the infeasibility of the polynomial reconstruction problem, which is a special case 
of the Reed–Solomon list decoding problem. The ability to deal with intra class variations in the 
biometric data along with the ability to work with unordered sets, which is commonly encountered in 
biometrics, makes the fuzzy vault scheme a promising solution for biometric cryptosystems. 
 
Fig. 3 depicts the operation of a fuzzy vault scheme. Suppose a user wishes to hide a secret K (e. g. 
a cryptographic key) using his or her biometric sample (template) which is represented as an unordered 
set X. The user selects a polynomial that encodes the secret and evaluates the polynomial on the all 
elements in X. The user then chooses a large number of random dummy minutiae point, called chaff 
points which do not lie on the polynomial P. The entire collection of points consisting of both points 
lying on and those that do not lie on P constitute the vault V. The chaff points conceal the genuine 
points lying on P from an attacker. Since the points lying on P encode the complete information about 
the template X and the secret K, concealing these points secures both the template and the secret 
simultaneously. The user can retrieve the secret K from the vault by providing another biometric 
sample query. Let the query be represented as another unordered set X’. If X’ overlaps substantially 
with X, then the user can identify many points in V that lie on P. If a sufficient number of points on P 
can be identified, an error correction scheme can be applied exactly to reconstruct P and thereby 
decode the secret K. If X’ does not overlap substantially with X, it is infeasible to reconstruct P and the 
authentication is unsuccessful. Since the secret can be retrieved from the vault even when X and X’ are 
not exactly the same, this scheme is referred to as a fuzzy vault [8]. 
The three main parameters in the fuzzy vault scheme are r, s and n. The parameter r denotes the 
number of points in the vault that lie on the polynomial P and it depends on the number of features that 
can be extracted from the template (e. g. number of minutia points in the user’s fingerprint). The 
parameter s represents the number of chaff points that are added and this parameter influences the 
security of the vault. If no chaff points are added, the vault reveals the information about the template 
and the secret. As more chaff points are added, the security increases. Typically, the number of chaff 
points is an order of magnitude larger than the number of genuine points >> r. Parameter n denotes the 
degree of the encoding polynomial and it controls the tolerance of the system to errors in the biometric 
data. 
In order to retrieve the secret from the vault V, the user selects a subset of r points from V, which is 
known as the unlocking set. The unlocking set is selected based on the query X’. Reed–Solomon 
decoding algorithm [9] is then applied to search for a polynomial of degree such that there are more 
than   points in the unlocking set that lie on P. If the number of discrepancies in the biometric data 
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 are less than , a valid polynomial can be reconstructed and the secret K can be 
successfully retrieved. 
Let (u, v, θ) be the attributes of a minutia point, where u and v indicate the row and column indices 
in the image, and θ represents the orientation of the minutia with respect to the horizontal axis. The 
minutia attributes are uniformly quantized and expressed as binary strings Qu, Qv and Qθ of lengths 
Bu, Bv and Bθ bits, respectively. The values of Bu, Bv and Bθ are chosen to be 6, 5 and 5, 
respectively, so that a 16-bit number can be obtained by concatenating the bit strings Qu, Qv and Qθ.  
A fixed number (denoted by r) of minutiae are selected based on their quality. A randomly generated 
key K of size 16n bits is represented as a polynomial P of degree n. The polynomial P is evaluated at 
the selected minutiae and these points constitute the locking set. A large number (denoted by s, s >> r) 
of chaff points are randomly generated and the combined set of minutiae and chaff is randomly 
reordered to obtain the vault V. To facilitate the alignment of query minutiae to the template, it is 
necessary to extract and store a set of high curvature points (known as helper data) from the template 
image. The helper data do not leak any information about the minutiae; yet it contains sufficient 
information to align the template and query finger knuckle prints 10. 
During authentication, the helper data extracted from the query image are aligned to the template 
helper data using trimmed Iterative Closest Point (ICP) algorithm11. The aligned query minutiae are 
used coarsely to filter out the chaff points in the vault. A minutia matcher12 is then applied to find the 
correspondences between the query minutiae and the remaining points in the vault and vault points 
have a matching minutia in the query constituting the unlocking set. For interpolation of a polynomial 
of degree n, at least (n+1) projections are needed. Therefore, if the size of the unlocking set is less than 
(n+1), it leads to authentication failure. If the unlocking set has (n+1) or more elements, all the possible 
subsets of size (n+1) are considered. Each of these subsets gives rise to a candidate polynomial and 
CRC-based error detection identifies the valid polynomial. If a valid polynomial is found, the 
authentication is successful and thus the template is protected. 
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 Fig. 3. General Operation of Fuzzy Vault   
 
4. Results and Discussion 
The performance of the proposed fuzzy vault implementation has been evaluated on Hong Kong 
polytechnic university Finger Knuckle Print (FKP) database.  In this fuzzy vault implementation for 
unimodal biometrics, the parameters used for evaluating the performances are Failure-to-Capture Rate 
(FTCR), Genuine Accept Rate (GAR), and False Accept Rate (FAR). The input sample provided by the 
user during authentication cannot be obtained or processed consistently. This error is called ‘failure to 
capture’ and the fraction of authentication attempts in which the biometric sample cannot be captured 
is known as Failure to Capture Rate (FTCR). The GAR is defined as the percentage of attempts made 
by genuine users that resulted in the successful authentication. The FAR is the percentage of attempts 
made by impostors that resulted in successful decoding of a vault corresponding to a legitimate user. 
 The main factor affecting the accuracy of a biometric system is noisy sensor data 13. Noise can 
be there in the acquired biometric data mainly due to faulty or improperly maintained sensors. For 
instance, accumulation of dirt or the residual remains on a fingerprint sensor can result in a noisy 
fingerprint image. Failure to focus the camera aptly can direct to blurring in images. The recognition 
accuracy of a biometric system is extremely sensitive to the quality of the biometric input and noisy 
data can result in a momentary reduction in the GAR of a biometric system 13. Performance analysis is 
carried out in two phases. In the initial phase, the secret key size is varied and the results are obtained. 
In phase two, the effect of adding noise are considered. Salt and pepper noise with a noise density of 
0.05 is added to analyze the strength of the unimodal fuzzy vault under noisy conditions. 
 
4.1 Phase I:Performance analysis of unimodal fuzzy vault 
 
Performance analysis is carried out in two phases. In phase I, the secret key size is varied and the 
results are obtained for the parameters FTCR, GAR and FAR. 
 
Table I shows that the FTCR varies from 4% to 3% and also increases the GAR of the system for all 
the values of n for the database of Hong Kong polytechnic university FKP database. Reducing the n 
value increases both GAR and FAR and increasing the n value lowers both GAR and FAR. It is also 
clear from the Table that GAR is high when n=6 and is it less when n=8.  
When impression from the right index FKP is used for encoding, FTCR of the system is 4% as in the 
first row of Table I. When the polynomial degree is 6, the secure key is 64 bits that corresponds to n = 
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6; the GAR and FAR of the system are 79 % and 0.15%, respectively. When the polynomial degree is 
7, the secure key is 128, the GAR and FAR of the system are 76 % and 0.06% and 75% and 0.05% for 
n=8 for the right index finger.  
Impression for the left index FKP is used for encoding: FTCR of the system is 3% as in the second 
row of Table I. When the polynomial degree is 6, the secure key is 64 bits that corresponds to n = 6; the 
GAR and FAR of the system are 86 % and 0.14%, respectively. When the polynomial degree is 7, the 
secure key is 128 bits that corresponds to n = 7; the GAR and FAR of the system are 84 % and 0.07%, 
83% and 0.03% for n=8 for left index finger.  
Table 1 
Performance of finger knuckle print fuzzy vault implementation 
 
 
 
From Fig.4 it is evident that left finger knuckle print produces better results compared to right finger 
knuckle print and also it is clear that the secure key of 64 bits that corresponds to n = 6 gives high 
GAR without salt and pepper noise. 
 
 
Fig. 4. GAR comparison without noise 
 
1.1 Phase II: Noise analysis of unimodal fuzzy vault 
  
In the second phase, the database under salt and pepper noise conditions is considered. Also the 
evaluation metrics for varying key size is calculated. The key size is varied from 64 bits to 256 bits and 
the results of the GAR and FAR obtained are shown in Table II. 
Table II  
Evaluation metrics obtained for unimodal fuzzy vault under noise 
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Biometrics 
n=6 
n=7 
n=8 
Input sample 
FTCR 
(%) 
n=8 n=7 
n=6 
GAR (%) FAR (%) GAR (%) FAR (%) GAR (%) FAR (%) 
Right index 
FKP 4 75 0.05 76 0.06 79 0.15 
Left index FKP 3 83 0.03 84 0.07 86 0.14 
Input sample 
n=8 n=7 n=6 
GAR (%) FAR (%) GAR (%) FAR (%) GAR (%) FAR (%) 
Right index 
FKP 62 20 69 12 67 24 
Left index FKP 68 22 70 15 67 23 
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Table II shows the GAR and FAR values for the unimodal fuzzy vaults under noisy condition and it 
is apparent from the table that the presence of salt and pepper noise increases the FAR value and 
decreases the GAR value to a large extent compared to its GAR and FAR values without noise. It is 
also evident that the presence of noise yields better results for the secure key size of 128 bits that 
corresponds to n=7. 
Right finger knuckle print is used for encoding after adding noise: the GAR and FAR of the system 
is given in Table II When the secure key is 64 bits that corresponds to n = 6, the GAR and FAR of the 
system are 67% and 24%, respectively. When the secure key is 128 bits that corresponds to n = 7, the 
GAR and FAR of the system are 69% and 12%, GAR and FAR for n=8 is 62% and 20% for finger 
knuckle print. 
Left finger knuckle print is used for encoding after adding noise: the GAR and FAR of the system is 
given in Table II When the secure key is 64 bits that corresponds to n = 6, the GAR and FAR of the 
system are 67% and 23%, respectively. When the secure key is 128 bits that corresponds to n = 7, the 
GAR and FAR of the system are 70% and 15%, GAR and FAR for n=8 is 68% and 22% for finger 
knuckle print. 
 
Fig. 5. GAR comparison with  noise 
 
5. Conclusion 
The authentication based on biometric information has several advantages compared to solely 
password-based systems, which has led to a growing interest of industry and of public authorities in 
biometric-based systems. To meet the high security standards concerning biometric data, template 
protection systems such as the fuzzy vault are indispensable to maintain the secrecy of the critical 
information. In this way this paper examines techniques for secure biometric recognition and efficient 
template storage. It provides a frame work for unimodal biometric recognition with fuzzy vault scheme 
for template security. The performance analysis is carried out for varying key sizes and is determined 
using three parameters FTCR, GAR and FAR. 
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